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applies them to the practice of PGD for comparison: Violation of human dignity, disrespect of the autonomy and the
physical integrity of the future child, discrimination of people living with a disability and the fear of slippery slope towards
immoral usage of the technology, e.g. designing children for specific third party interests. Our analysis did not reveal any
fundamental differences with regard to the four concerns.
Conclusion: We argue that with regard to the four arguments analyzed in this paper germline gene editing should be
considered morally (at least) as acceptable as the selection of genomes on the basis of PGD. However, we also argue that
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Background
The recent discovery of CrisprCas (clustered regularly
interspaced short palindromic repeats - Crispr associated
systems) set in motion a worldwide wave of scientific pro-
gress in the field of gene editing. CrisprCas is a compara-
tively cheap, efficient, precise, and easy-to-use alternative to
already existing gene editing tools [1–3]. These scientific
advances present major ethical concerns, especially in re-
gard to the potential use of CrisprCas on germline cells:
Spermatozoa, oocytes and their progenitors, e.g. embryonic
cells in early development - cells that take part in
reproduction and therefore pass on their genetic content to
the next generation. At present, human germline gene edit-
ing (GGE) is prohibited by national legislation and inter-
national declarations, e.g. by the Oviedo Convention
published by the Council of Europe in 1997 [4–6]. Gene
editing techniques could be applied to human embryos
within the context of in vitro fertilization (IVF) in order to
modify disease associated genes and therefore interrupt the
transmission of hereditary conditions. The work of Liang
et al. [7] published in 2015, which uses CrisprCas on non-
viable human embryos to investigate the efficacy and speci-
ficity of the method, initiated an international debate on
the permissibility of such research as well as future clinical
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applications. While the international community was still
engaged in a controversy discussion about the morality of
germline gene-editing in human reproductive cells, the pot
was stirred in November of 2018 when journalists covered
the CrisprCas gene-edited twins born in China [8]. Oppo-
nents of GGE argue that the danger of unpredictable effects
on future generations, technical difficulties compromising
patient safety, as well as other serious ethical concerns out-
weigh potential benefits of germline gene editing [9]. Fur-
ther, it is argued that with preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD), an effective tool for avoiding the transmis-
sion of severe hereditary diseases in assisted reproductive
technology (ART) already exists, which renders the use of
germline modification unnecessary for the majority of cases
[9, 10]. PGD was first introduced in 1990 by a British team
as a means of preventing the transmission of X-
chromosomal linked disease [11]. The concept of PGD is
that several embryos created via IVF treatment are analyzed
for genetic anomalies associated with specific diseases, with
the objective of identifying and selecting an unaffected em-
bryo for transfer into the uterine cavity, while the remaining
embryos are discarded [12]. Since the 1990s and after con-
siderable controversy, PGD has become an established
practice in Europe covered by law and national guidelines
[13]. According to the Center for Genetics and Society
“there is no persuasive medical reason to manipulate the
human germline because inherited genetic diseases can be
prevented using embryo screening techniques” [14]. Also,
In 2018, the recommendation published by the European
Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE/
ESHG) discusses adoption or gamete donation as possible
alternatives to GGE, [15]. Of course, if a couple wishes to
conceive a genetically related child, PGD is the only real al-
ternative to GGE.
However, in ca. 19% of cases IVF only leads to one vi-
able embryo [16]. In this case a parent who is a carrier
of a dominant disease only has a 50% of begetting a
“healthy” child. Also, for rare cases, e.g. when both par-
ents are homozygous carriers of a recessive transmitted
disease like cystic fibrosis, PGD does not represent an al-
ternative to GGE as all produced embryos would be af-
fected by the gene defect.
Thus, a recommendation published in 2017 by the Na-
tional Academy of Science and National Academy of
Medicine (NAS/NAM) concludes that clinical research
on GGE in assisted reproductive technology should be
considered a morally permissible option if no other al-
ternatives exist [17]. In accordance, the recently pub-
lished report by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in
2018 concludes that GGE could be ethically acceptable if
“reproductive cells that have been subject to heritable
genome editing interventions are (should only be) only
used for purposes that are consistent with the welfare of
the future person” and if “the use of heritable genome
editing interventions is (should be) consistent with social
justice and solidarity so that it should not be expected to
increase disadvantage, discrimination, or division in soci-
ety” [18].
The ESHRE/ ESHG recommendation argues that,
from a deontological perspective, GGE is morally more
permissible than PGD because PGD leads to the selec-
tion between embryos instead of ‘treating’ them [15].
This begs the question whether GGE should rather be
preferred over PGD, instead of being an ultima ratio op-
tion for cases of severe hereditary diseases.
To evaluate the validity of this claim, the present art-
icle analyzes and compares GGE and PGD in more de-
tail. Four of the most prominent ethical concerns that
have been raised against GGE are evaluated and com-
pared to the practice of PGD: Violation of human dig-
nity, disrespect of the autonomy and the physical
integrity of the future child, discrimination of people liv-
ing with a disability and the fear of slippery slope to-
wards immoral usage of the technology, e.g. designing
children for specific, third party interests [15, 17–20].
We selected these four concerns as they play a promin-
ent role in public discourse and are often used as cat-
egorical arguments against GGE. By comparing GGE
and PGD with a view to these arguments we want to see
if PGD – as an established, legal practice in many coun-
tries – fares any better than GGE. If both technologies
were comparable with regard to these arguments this
would be an interesting finding given the by now wide-
spread acceptance of PGD and the skepticism concerning
GGE. We are aware that the arguments chosen represent
a selection. There are many additional important issues to
discuss including social justice, equality and allocation of
resources within a society [10, 17, 18, 21, 22]. It would go
beyond the scope of this article to address them all. Also,
some of these concerns are not specific to gene editing
but hold true for modern medicine in general. For in-
stance, safety and security are very important concerns in
this context. We do not want to dwell on these argu-
ments here, for we think they would distract from
ethical concerns that are more specific to germline
gene editing. Therefore, for the sake of the argument,
we will assume that PGD and GGE will in the near
future be considered equally accessible and equally
safe (while also acknowledging that at this moment in
time this might not yet be the case).
The timeliness, relevance and urgency of addressing
the ethical issues of germline gene editing and prenatal
genetic diagnosis is highlighted by recent publications
and recommendations, e.g. from the National Ethics
Committee of Switzerland 2016 (NEC) [19], the National
Academy of Science and the National Academy of Medi-
cine 2017 (NAS; NAM) [17]; the Berlin Brandenburg
Akademie der Wissenschaften 2015 (BBAW) [20], the
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Nuffield Council [18] and the background document of
the European Society of Human Genetics and the Euro-
pean Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology
2018 (ESHG/ ESHRE) [15]. Therefore, we believe that
this paper can help inform current policy discussions
and may be of interest to health care professionals, in
particular in the fields of reproductive medicine and
pediatric care. Medical professionals play an important
role in advocating children’s rights to good health care
and by being involved in long term care of children liv-
ing with a genetic disease they understand different as-
pects and impacts of certain diseases on the patient’s
and the parents’ lives. Further, their opinion will guide
future parents who seek advice for family planning.
Main text
Human dignity and the human genome
The Council of Europe emphasizes human dignity in its
recommendation on Genetic Engineering in 1982 by
stating that “the rights to life and to human dignity pro-
tected by Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights imply the right to inherit a genetic
pattern which has not been artificially changed” [23].
Building upon this, the Oviedo Convention of 1997,
which serves as a legally binding treaty between its rati-
fying countries, prohibits the gene modification of germ-
line cells [4]. Further, the UNESCO Declaration on the
Human Genome and Human Rights in 1997 (UDHGHR)
states that “the human genome underlies the fundamen-
tal unity of all members of the human family, as well as
the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In
a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity.” [24].
Human dignity has been linked to the human genome in
at least two ways: The respect for the intrinsic worth of
an individual human being in relation to its genome as
well as the importance of the human genome for the in-
tegrity of the human species [25]. Human germline gene
modification and human dignity has been discussed on
both levels.
Risk of instrumentalization
In several recent bioethics recommendations [15, 17, 19, 20]
The danger of violating human dignity by modifying the
genome of a future child in order to fulfil the parental and/
or societal expectations, thereby undermining the right to
self-determination has been discussed. In other words, com-
ing into existence would no longer be left to chance, but
would be linked to certain - genetic - conditions.
The discussion regarding violation of human dignity
often revolves around the concepts of ‘intrinsic value’
and ‘instrumentalization’. “Instrumentalization” in this
context can be understood as someone (agent) using an
entity (means) in a certain way (mode) for a specific pur-
pose [26]. The concept of intrinsic value claims that all
human beings have an intrinsic value that must be
respected. Respect for the intrinsic value of a person de-
mands that every person should be treated as an end in
themselves and should never be reduced to their instru-
mental value, i.e. they should never be treated as a mere
means to someone else’s end [25]. Kant formulated this
in his categorical imperative as “act in such a way that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, never merely as a means to an
end, but always at the same time as an end. “[27].
Opponents now claim that GGE represents a risk of
instrumentalization. To test the validity of this claim, we
have to look at the specific context in which the technol-
ogy is employed. In our example, future parents (agent)
use an embryo (means) for GGE (mode) in the interest
of “X” (purpose). If “X” solely means the interest of the
parents to get a healthy child, then one can potentially
argue that GGE in this context represents an instrumen-
talization since the embryo is only used as a mere means
to the end of the parents (i.e. interest to get a healthy
child). If “X” represents the interests of the parents for
their future child and the interests of the future child to
have a healthy life, e.g. if GGE is used with due respect
for the child’s best interests and subject to the principle
of beneficence, then it can hardly be argued that GGE is
treating the future child as a mere means for the ends of
the parents and as such would not represent a morally
problematic form of instrumentalization.
It is difficult to see how modifying an embryo in GGE
would represent a morally more problematic form of
instrumentalization (i.e. treatment as a mere end) com-
pared to discarding surplus embryos as done in PGD as
long as its use is restricted to the selection of embryos
based on medical characteristics such as severe heredi-
tary monogenetic diseases.
Importantly, this is not at all to say that we oppose the
generation and destruction of embryos for reproductive
purposes. This is to show that it is difficult to argue
against GGE on grounds of instrumentalization when
comparing GGE to the morally accepted practice of
PGD.
Integrity of the human species
In an article by Annas et al. germline genetic modifica-
tion is described as a “crime against humanity” as it
changes the foundation of the human species and there-
fore threatens human rights [28]. Bearing in mind the
events leading to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights 1948 (UDHR) - World War II and the Nazi atro-
cities - the need to protect the human genome as a ‘con-
sensus’ for all of humanity, without discriminating
anyone on the basis of cultural or religious stigmata or
mental states becomes evident. The history of eugenic
practices, not only under the Nazi regime but also across
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the world, motivated the protection of the human gen-
ome, especially in the face of advancements in gene
technology. However, the implication of this for gene
modifications is unclear since there is not one human
genome [29]. What is generally regarded as “the human
genome” is a mere snapshot of evolution since all ge-
nomes are naturally undergoing constant change [30].
Although two unrelated individuals share a majority of
their genes, an average human genome exhibits 4,1–5
millions variants compared to a reference genome, lead-
ing to different phenotypes including different expres-
sion of diseases [31, 32].
GGE to prevent genetically inherited diseases, would
change an allele of a specific gene which is associated
with a disease and would replace it with another
(“healthy”) allele of the same gene. Thus, over time, no
“new” genes are introduced into the gene pool, only the
relative abundance of specific alleles is changed. Based
on the assumption that only disease-associated genes are
replaced with alleles without the specific mutation and
under the assumption that the dynamic state of the hu-
man genome is included in Annas et al.’s argument on
the ‘heritage of humanity’ [28], it is not evident why re-
placing one allele associated with a disease with another
variant of the same gene would violate the integrity of the
human species. Here, the Nuffield Council concludes that
“there is much more to being human than the possession
of a particular kind of genome” [18]. Another expression
of this concern refers to ‘the naturalness’ or ‘sacredness’ of
the human genome. The “naturalness” argument is based
on the idea that nature is “good” and that it is wrong to
intervene in nature. David Hume has argued that an
‚ought’ cannot be derived from an ‚is’ [33] and thus the
foundation for the normative claim not to change nature
is missing without whom one cannot derive any moral du-
ties, responsibilities or moral guidelines for action.
Further, in today’s modern medicine it is unclear how
“natural” forms of treatment are supposed to be distin-
guished from “unnatural” forms, e.g. most medical inter-
ventions aiming to prevent or treat a disease, such as the
application of antibiotics to fight infection or resuscita-
tion to fight death, could by the same token be consid-
ered as ‘unnatural’.
Arguments regarding the ‘sacredness’ of the human
genome claim normative force by referring to the au-
thority of god. We argue that claims regarding the au-
thority of a divine being have little weight in secular
contexts. Even if it did, it is unclear how changes to the
human genome by human germline editing are funda-
mentally different from other (accepted and performed)
actions to change or select human genes and genetic
traits, e.g. selective mating (in a voluntary context, i.e. an
individual choice based on perceived attractiveness of a
partner or her skills [16]), epigenetic changes or PGD.
Based on this, we do not believe that the objections to
GGE based on ‘naturalness’ or ‘sacredness’ hold much
normative weight [17, 19, 20].
As stated, GGE could change the relative abundance
of certain alleles in human populations. The same, of
course, holds true for PGD. Under the assumption that
no artificial or “foreign” genes are introduced through
GGE, PGD and GGE are not fundamentally different
with regards to their impact on the human gene pool.
Physical integrity and autonomy of the future child
Physical integrity
The Child Right International Network (CRIN) refers to
‘bodily integrity’ by stating” … everyone, including chil-
dren, has the right to autonomy and self-determination
over their own body, and the only person with the right
to make a decision about one’s body is oneself” [34]. Al-
though not covering the complexity of the issue, the
right of autonomous decisions over one’s own body and
the right of self-determination are very important com-
ponents in order to protect the ‘physical’ or ‘bodily’ in-
tegrity of a person [35].
In the following we will discuss the validity of the
claim that GGE violates the child’s physical integrity by
interfering with its genome without having the child’s
consent and to what extend this can be applied to PGD
[19, 20].
Opponents to GGE point to Articles 2 and 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights which imply
that the future child has “the right to inherit a genetic
pattern which has not been artificially changed” [23].
This argument, we think, is problematic on grounds that
Gyngell et al. [16] have pointed out: “social forces have
been affecting our genome for generations.[...] social and
environmental influences affect gene expression through
epigenetic effects, and these changes may be passed on
to the next generation. “[16, 36]. Based on this, culture
and parenting as well as germline gene editing affect our
genome and gene expression. The difference is that the
first leads to epigenetic changes (e.g. DNA methylation),
whereas the second leads to changes in the actual base
sequence of the DNA. However, both represent bio-
chemical changes to the same molecule, and both lead
significant phenotypic changes and as such, it is difficult
to argue that one is different from the other and funda-
mentally different to other influences on the expression
of the genome, e.g. parental decisions without the con-
sent of the child.
The ‘non-identity problem’ was initially described by
Parfit [37] and deals with the question how current ac-
tions can affect future generations, e.g. we affect the lives
of future generations “by determining the kinds of social,
political, economic and environmental circumstances
that prevail. Our choices impact not only on what social
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conditions are left behind, but also who lives under
those conditions. The very existence and identities of fu-
ture generations depend on what choices and decisions
we make. Yet if the identities of future generations de-
pend on what we do now, then whoever exists in the fu-
ture cannot claim to have been harmed by our actions
when those actions turn out to be a condition of their
existence.” [38].
This can be applied to PGD as follows: After a positive
test result (meaning that the embryo carries the disease -
associated gene mutation), parents can choose for or
against one specific embryo. Therefore, the embryo will
be born with its impairment or it will not come into ex-
istence as a person at all. According to the “non-iden-
tity” problem, one cannot harm someone when the
alternative is non-existence. In the case of PGD, the se-
lection of an embryo would thus not prevent nor cause
harm, respectively or violate the physical autonomy or
self-determination of a future child since the alternative
would have been non-existence. From this, it follows
that prevention of harm from a future child cannot serve
as argument against or in favor of PGD.
With regard to GGE in the context of the physical in-
tegrity of the unborn child, one has to consider whether
the successful correction of the gene mutation will a)
change the identity of the future child, b) whether GGE
is a necessary condition that an embryo is chosen for
implantation, and c) whether the modification is in the
best interest of the future child.
In response to the first issue, it can be argued that modi-
fying one gene does not change the identity of a person,
respectively an embryo as a person-to-be, since it changes
only a very small part of its biomolecular structure, which
is by nature constantly subject to change, e.g. mutations
due to external stimuli such as sun light or natural mis-
takes in DNA duplication and repair. Of course, a severe
disease can have a significant influence on a person’s life,
but so do other circumstances such as education or where
a child grows up. The choice of how to educate a given
child will impact its life in many ways but does not lead to
different children. Analogously, a life with or without a
certain disease cannot be interpreted as choosing between
different persons, but rather changes the course of a per-
son’s life. Therefore, we follow the interpretation that
GGE does not change the identity of an embryo as a
person-to-be, since the same individual would be born -
with or without a disease-causing gene.
Regarding the second, it depends whether GGE is a
necessary condition for implantation. If that is the case,
then GGE doesn’t represent a potential harm for the fu-
ture child, for the alternative to GGE would have been
‘non-existence’.
Assuming that GGE is not a necessary condition for
the parents to choose a specific embryo for implantation,
e.g. parents would implant an embryo with or without
GGE or irrespective of the success of GGE, then GGE
can potentially harm the future child. For example, pro-
spective parents who both carry two alleles of the gene
causing cystic fibrosis may come to the decision that
they will only implant the embryo if it first undergoes
genetic modification. This modification might have po-
tential harmful side-effects. Thus, to defuse the objection
that GGE threatens to violate the unborn child’s physical
integrity, GGE would have to be save enough that the
genetic modification is allegedly in the best interest of
the future child. In clinical practice, the concept of ‘in-
formed consent’ plays a major role in protecting the
physical integrity of a patient. Medical procedures may
only be performed if the patient or her legal representa-
tive consents to a certain intervention after considering
the relevant facts, risks and alternatives. GGE as one
treatment option among others in pediatric care, the de-
cision whether or not to proceed with it has to be taken
by the parents ensuring the informed consent with re-
gard to the best interests of their future child. Thus, ap-
plying GGE to an embryo with the best interest for the
future child in mind does not per se imply a violation of
its physical integrity if the resulting future child will in
all likelihood not be worse off than the child from the
untreated embryo would have been.
To summarize, the non-identity problem and the con-
cern of violating the future child’s physical integrity po-
tentially apply to GGE but not to PGD. However, when
parents take the informed decision to apply GGE on an
embryo in order to prevent the manifestation of a severe
hereditary disease under careful consideration of risks
and benefits for the child, GGE can hardly be seen as a
violation of the physical integrity of the future child.
While PGD can only be endorsed through reproductive
autonomy - reproductive autonomy and acting benefi-
cently towards the future child are potential arguments
in favour of GGE. Thus, under the conditions explained
above, GGE should not be seen as an infringement of
the physical integrity of the future child – or at least not
as a fundamentally different infringement compared to
other parental (medical) decisions for their unborn or
non-autonomous child, e.g. nutrition, lifestyle of preg-
nant mother, education, etc.
Autonomy
Feinberg has objected that a child has a right to an ‘open
future’. He explains that children hold ‘anticipatory au-
tonomy rights’ [39], rights that they do not have yet but
will gain once they reach maturity and become capable
of exercising them. One of these is the right to live an
autonomous life and to make one’s own decisions e.g.
concerning health care. Feinberg states that irreversible
decisions should be postponed until “the child reaches
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maturity and is legally capable of making them himself”
[39]. Thus, the right to an open future restricts what
parents (and others) are allowed to do to children or the
unborn child. Feinberg identifies “rights-in-trust,” as
rights that „look like adult autonomy rights ... except
that the child cannot very well exercise his free choice
until later when he is more fully formed and capable ...
rights that are to be saved for the child until he is an
adult, but which can be violated “in advance,” so to
speak, before the child is even in a position to exercise
them... His right while he is still a child is to have these
future options kept open until he is a fully formed self-
determining adult capable of deciding among them
“[39]. GGE is an irreversible decision, potentially chan-
ging major parts of a person’s life in important ways. On
the account of Feinberg, the right to an open future in
the discussion on GGE thus poses the question whether
GGE is morally acceptable given its potential to signifi-
cantly change a person’s life without having her consent.
Mills on the other hand claims that it is unclear what it
means to keep options open in the context of what it
means to be a “good parent” [40]: “Should our goal be to
raise our children so that that they will have, as adults, as
many options as possible, to give them, insofar as we can,
a maximally “open” future? Or should our goal be more
directive, to lead our children toward a more specifically
shaped future that we ourselves endorse? “Thus, Fein-
berg’s theory has been criticized on the ground that it is
“impossible and undesirable to try to provide children
with an ‘open future’ in any meaningful sense” [41]. A lot
of necessary parental decisions concerning external fac-
tors, e.g. a child’s education, religion, diet, sports, friends,
neighborhood etc. are unavoidable and will have an im-
pact on the future life of the child. Mills argues that it is
not only not possible but even more importantly not de-
sirable for parents to be “neutral” in raising their children
and „steering them, however imperceptibly, toward one
option rather than another “[40]. Thus, parenting always
requires some (unavoidable and non-neutral) steering
(making decisions for the child without its consent) which
are biased by what we deem (morally) desirable or in the
best interest of the child. However, the positions of Fein-
berg and Mills are not always necessarily mutually exclu-
sive, especially when chosen a moderate interpretation of
the right to an open future [42]. Many parenting decisions
will lead to temporary closure or opening of doors. How-
ever, this is often reversible in nature and thus still main-
tains (according to our understanding of Feinberg) the
possibility for an open future for the child. Of course, par-
enting will always lead to opening some doors more than
others. Past experiences can never be made undone and
some decisions made by parents can be re-shaped in the
future while others might potentially be irreversible. But
such is the nature of parenting.
Preventing a severe hereditary disease by changing the
DNA sequence in an embryo potentially opens up op-
portunities for that individual later in life, e.g. to pursue
a regular education or to become an athlete. On the
other hand, the person will not experience what it means
to live with the condition in question. As Gyngell et al.
have pointed out, GGE to eliminate a disease would
under certain circumstances rather represent an
autonomy-enhancing effect (due to it’s effect on health
and the possibilities for the future child) thus outweigh-
ing restrictions on autonomy “due to the presence of
domination, manipulation or control” [16] of the par-
ents. Or to rephrase, GGE to prevent severe hereditary
diseases with the goal to increase the health of a future
child will likely open many doors that would be closed
otherwise. Likewise, it is rather „disease and disorder,
not gene editing [...] that presents the greatest threat to
future autonomy” [16]. Based on this, GGE cannot be
rejected based on Feinberg’s account.
The concept of the right to an ‘open future’ can’t be
applied to PGD: In PGD the parents choose between
two embryos (existence vs non-existence) and not be-
tween two options for one embryo. This again highlights
- similarly to the non-identity-problem - the conceptual
difference and diverging ethical concerns between PGD
and GGE, namely selection between embryos vs. thera-
peutic options for one embryo [10].
Discrimination of people living with a disability
Social vs. medical model of disability
Central to the medical model of disability is a malfunc-
tion of the body, e.g. not being able to walk. In contrast,
the social model argues that disadvantages experienced
by people living with a disability are a result of the mis-
match between the variability of the human body and
societal norms what a body should be like, e.g. the in-
accessibility of buildings or public transportation due to
stairs when ambulating in a wheelchair [41, 43].
Since the introduction of prenatal testing (PNT) for
malformation of the fetus or genetic aberrations followed
by selective abortion in the 1970s in order to enhance re-
productive choice, the disability rights movement argues
that such interventions discriminate people living with a
disability [44–46]. It has been argued that these tests
reinforce the ‘medical model’ of disability, while leaving
aside social components with the respective disability [47].
Along these lines J. Scully has pointed out that “If it is true
that a significant proportion of the disadvantage of certain
disabilities come from social arrangements and not the
impairment per se, we should then be aware that prioritiz-
ing genetic interventions is choosing to tackle a socially
based difficulty through biological means” [46]. GGE and
PGD enforce the medical model of disability in similar
ways - both methods aim to fulfil the parental wish of
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begetting a healthy child through a medical intervention.
Thus, PGD and GGE compared to the social model can
be understood as two fundamentally different approaches
to the same problem.
Disability and disease are very broad terms. Disadvan-
tages caused by one condition may be more easily socially
explained - and potentially removed through changes in
outer circumstances - than others. For example, whether
or not being restricted in daily routine, education or work
life when ambulating in a wheelchair highly depends on
the infrastructure provided. Whether or not a child with
trisomy 21 is included within the neighborhood and ad-
equately supported in school heavily depends on societal
attitudes and willingness to invest. In contrast, living with
hereditary immunodeficiency is much harder to tackle by
societal measures because bacteria and viruses can hardly
be eliminated from our daily life. Thus, notwithstanding
its relevance, the social model of disability can alleviate
some aspects of disease burden, however, it cannot cover
all of them.
The ‘expressivist argument’
In PGD an embryo is chosen or discarded based on a
specific genetic trait. Similarly, in GGE an embryo with a
specific genetic trait is subject to modification and under
the assumption that the modification is successful, the
embryo is chosen for implantation.
This now begs the question whether this imposes a
Yes or No statement towards an embryo or future child
or towards a specific genetic trait and disease, e.g.
whether the choice for or against a specific genotype dis-
criminates people living with the respective condition.
A Hasting Centre report in 1999 morally objects pre-
natal testing [45, 48] based on the ‘expressivist argu-
ment’ which claims that “selective abortion after
prenatal diagnosis is morally problematic as it expresses
negative or discriminatory attitudes, not merely about a
disabling trait, but about those who carry it.” [44]. The
report states that “... with discrimination more generally
(...) a single trait stands in for the whole. (...) The tests
send the message that there’s no need to find out about
the rest” [48]. Advocates of the expressivist argument
claim that PGD and GGE discriminate people living with
the respective condition, as it implies that the condition
is ‘not wanted’. Importantly, according to the argument,
perceived discrimination is morally relevant even if dis-
crimination was not intended.
However, there is a fundamental difference between
preferring a future child not to have a specific disease
and valuing life or human beings living with said disease
as a life not worth living or a life less valuable. Similarly,
Savulescu has challenged the general validity of the
‘expressivist argument’ by highlighting the importance of
differentiating between disability and persons living with
a disability. He states that “selection reduces the former,
but is silent on the value of the latter” [49]. This is espe-
cially interesting in the context of medicine - In medi-
cine, after all, it is the goal to treat diseases and most
people that are suffering from a disease will undergo
treatment (if available). And probably almost everybody
will agree that this does not represent a discrimination
of people carrying this disease.
According to Savulescu there is no moral reason to
deny parents access to PGD on the basis of the ‘expressi-
vist argument’. He points out that the individual choice
of parents must not be understood as a general state-
ment on people living with that disease. A comparison
can be drawn to a case in which parents want their
obese child to lose weight. The fact alone that they en-
courage their child to live an active life and eat healthy
food to lose weight is not discriminatory towards other
obese people, unless the respect, love and appreciation
of the parents for the child depend on successful weight-
loss. In this context, GGE should be understood as a
medical option to avoid the manifestation of a severe
hereditary disease. The (medical) intervention itself - the
prevention of a severe hereditary disease for one specific
embryo – should not be perceived as discriminatory
even if the genotype of the embryo is decisive for the
parental decision to use or discard of a specific embryo.
Notwithstanding that the expressivist argument and
perceived discrimination of carriers of certain diseases
might not stand up to ethical scrutiny, one can still dis-
cuss the moral relevance of this perceived discrimin-
ation. If it is regarded as morally relevant, then society
and the medical community should be made aware of
this aspect and measures could be implemented to de-
crease the perceived discrimination e.g. through educa-
tion of the public on disability and disease and better
integration of people living with a specific disease in our
society. However, we do not think that PGD or GGE
should be objected based on the expressivist argument.
Slippery slope argument
The basic structure of a slippery slope argument (SSA)
is that if a certain action (A) is allowed, another action
(B) will necessarily follow or is very likely to follow. At
the point in time when (A) is under review with regard
to its moral permissibility, (B) is judged to be clearly
wrong. Therefore, A must not be allowed in order to
protect the prohibition of (B). The two events (A) and
(B) may be linked by multiple intermediate steps [50].
The validity of a SSA - at least in a logical reasoning -
depends on the likelihood of (B) and whether (A) inevit-
ably or very likely leads to a ‘loss of control’ resulting in
(B) [50]. Thus, slippery slope arguments have the struc-
ture of having „an initial, seemingly acceptable decision,
(2) a dangerous outcome that is unacceptable, and (3) a
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process or mechanism leading from the initial decision
to the dangerous outcome” [51].
Nick Agar suggested a distinction of “morally wrong”
and “morally problematic” interventions. N. Agar argues
that all instances of an intervention properly identified
as essentially morally wrong are morally wrong (e.g.
most agree that blowing up your neighbor’s car without
a compelling justifying reason is always morally imper-
missible). However, morally problematic interventions
are problematic precisely because they comprise both
morally bad and morally good interventions” [52], e.g.
PGD and GGE can potentially be used for gender selec-
tion, but they can also be used for the prevention and
treatment of severe hereditary diseases. Based on this,
GGE and PGD, should be seen as morally problematic
but not morally wrong interventions because of their po-
tential applications ranging from morally good to mor-
ally wrong [52].
Opponents of GGE formulate slippery slope argu-
ments analogously to the above- provided SSA structure:
If germline gene editing was allowed in human medicine
for severe hereditary diseases (A), this would necessarily
lead to violation of human dignity through eugenic use
of the technology, instrumentalization of future children
through non-medical enhancement and increased in-
equity in society through an artificial distribution of
favourable biological characteristics among people living
within this society (B) [15, 17, 19, 20].
Validity of the SSA against GGE
We will argue that the assumption that allowing GGE
for medical purposes (A), e.g. treating severe hereditary
diseases, inevitably or most likely leads to (B) rests on
several empirical assumptions that are, prima facie, not
obvious or difficult to prove.
First, for (B) to follow from (A), (B) obviously has to
be scientifically feasible, i.e. it has to be scientifically pos-
sible to genetically modify strenght, eye and hair colour,
height, stamina, intelligence, charisma, dexterity, agility,
etc. Second, Walton coined the term “drivers” for social
and political factors “driving forward of the chain of ar-
gumentation from the premises to the conclusion (the
claim that the predicted disastrous outcome will occur)
[...] [53]. This means that, the notion that allowance of
(A) will lead to an increased moral acceptability of (B)
either implies that (A) and (B) are either similar on a
fundamental level or that there are obvious drivers push-
ing towards (B), for otherwise the causality between
allowing (A) leading to (B) seems not comprehensible.
Third, the loss of control caused by (A) leading to (B)
rejects the possibility that regulations and laws are
means to prevent sliding down the slope. We will elab-
orate on these assumptions below.
One potential driver is scientific developments and the
probability that geneticists will be able to reliably predict
what genes need to be changed in order to increase the
likelihood of some ‘positive’ phenotype e.g. intelligence,
athletic prowess, charisma, appearance, etc. Indeed, it
may one day potentially become possible to identify and
modify genes important for muscle growth, agility, dex-
terity, perseverance, intelligence, humor, among others.
However, to this day, the knowledge regarding many of
these complex traits (which are not necessarily only gen-
etic in nature) is still limited (with eye and hair colour
being exceptions). Without the scientific feasibility (A)
cannot (yet) lead to (B). For the sake of the argument we
will however assume that it is or soon will be scientific-
ally feasible. In our opinion, there are, prima facie, no
obvious reasons supporting the claim that only because
we “could” that we actually “would” use GGE for non-
medical purposes.
This claim is based on the believe that the moral ac-
ceptance for using gene editing for medical purposes
would increase moral acceptance for non-medical use of
GGE and eugenics. This assumptions rests on the idea
that public acceptance for (A) is high, whereas (B) is per-
ceived as clearly wrong. This view is reflected in a state-
ment of the US National Academies stating that “with
stringent oversight, heritable germline editing clinical
trials could one day be permitted for serious conditions;
non-heritable clinical trials should be limited to treating
or preventing disease or disability at this time and that
„genome editing for enhancement should not be allowed
at this time “[54]. Furthermore, the assumption implies
that (A) and (B) are fundamentally similar or that there
are specific drivers leading to a loss of control and slid-
ing towards (B).
The rationale behind GGE for the treatment of severe
(hereditary) diseases is therapeutic, i.e. to cure a disease
to generate health. The use of GGE for non-medical
purposes is, as the name implies, non-therapeutic in na-
ture, i.e. it is an enhancement and/or change of a “non-
disease” phenotype, e.g. increased height or change of
hair color, respectively.
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and plastic surgery
can, in theory, also be used for non-therapeutic purposes.
However, this is not seen as sufficient reason to prohibit
these practices. Also, from a medical ethics point of view
these two applications seem prima facie not similar but ra-
ther fundamentally different. The principle of beneficence
claims that physicians have a duty to prevent harm from a
patient. If GGE is understood as therapy and the future
child as patient, then one could make an argument that
physicians should act in the best interest of the future child
and thus, GGE for the treatment of severe diseases could
be compatible with the principle of beneficence. However,
this does not hold true for GGE for non-medical purposes.
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Further, we do not think that there are uncontrollable
drivers pushing us down the slope. On the contrary, we
think that there is at least one driver that can push us in
the opposite direction. According to Walton an SSA
“needs to be set in a framework of deliberation that is so-
cial, that even involves whole countries, and is highly
dependent on forming policies that will set laws in place.
As the technology evolves, the debates will continue, and
rules will be proposed by governments formulating stat-
utes that will be binding on the courts and will be subject
to legal argumentation. What prevents the gray area from
playing its part in generating a slippery slope argument is
the formation of bright lines, clear rules that can tell us
that we can only go so far in the sequence of actions and
no further” [53]. This implies that the risk of a slippery
slope depends on jurisdictions in countries and that SSAs
should always take the power of laws to prevent a slippery
slope from occurring into consideration.
The power of laws and regulations to prevent a slip-
pery slope is illustrated by the following example in the
Netherlands, where euthanasia has become an estab-
lished part of Dutch medical practice since the 70s [55].
Euthanasia was not legalized, but ‘mercy killings’ were
overlooked by Dutch prosecution. In the 90s a legislation
was introduced that (although still not legalizing euthan-
asia) came with certain restrictions for it. Doctors now
had to report cases of ‘mercy killing’ which were subject
to investigation to determine if the doctors should be
prosecuted. This shows how sliding on the slope may
work in both directions, i.e. how moral and legal actions
can prevent an uncontrolled movement from (A) to (B).
If GGE ever becomes feasible in human reproductive
medicine, jurisdictions around the globe will face the dif-
ficult challenge of how to regulate it. The regulation of
genetic tests including PGD is relevant here for two rea-
sons: First, the genetic testing of an embryo will be the
foundation of any application of GGE [15]. Second, it is
likely that the regulation of GGE - or at least how indi-
cations are defined - will resemble the regulation of
PGD in a certain country. GGE on human reproductive
cells is still prohibited in many countries, e.g. Australia,
Canada, Germany, Israel, Switzerland, Netherlands,
whereas PGD is a widely accepted and legal practice.
The regulation of PGD varies between countries around
the world in mainly two aspects: How regulation is
enforced (e.g. legislation vs. less enforceable guidelines)
and what indications are eligible. Most European coun-
tries do have effective regulations in place [13, 56]. For
example, Swiss legislation clearly restricts the use of
PGD for cases of severe hereditary diseases and defines
the term ‘severe hereditary disease’ through specific cri-
teria (e.g. conditions that lead to analgesia resistant pain,
reduced motoric abilities through paralysis or inability to
communicate) in order to clarify which conditions are
eligible for PGD [57]. However, differences within differ-
ent European jurisdictions exist, e.g. some countries
allow PGD for different indications, e.g. HLA typing of
donor siblings (HLA compatibility of donor and recipi-
ent is important to organ or bone marrow transplant-
ation. If a child suffers e.g. from leukaemia and no
suitable bone marrow donor is found, then parents
could select from a number of embryos the one embryo
that would be most suitable as a donor for the older sib-
ling) [13]. Under Belgian law, it is stated that PGD may
not be used to pursue eugenic aims - further regulation
is left to medical centers carrying out IVF treatments
[58]. The UK has published a list of conditions approved
eligible to PGD by the Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act [59].
Regulation of PGD in the US and in China differ from
that in Europe. The US has no federal law regulating the
use of PGD (or GGE) but leaves it to the state legislation.
On the whole, a liberal approach emphasizing reproduct-
ive liberty is followed, resulting in 9% of PGD usage for
social sexing. Furthermore, centers exist which, upon par-
ental request, provide PGD to select in favor of certain
diseases such as dwarfism or deafness [60]. In China, an
enormous increase of PGD usage was reported, highlight-
ing differences in the societal attitude towards PGD in
comparison to Western Europe. In particular, moral con-
cerns regarding eugenic use or discrimination of disability
are much less pronounced in China. Nevertheless, the
Chinese government has restricted the use of PGD, which
may not be used to select for non-medical features [61].
To conclude, slippery slope arguments are often based
on and depend on multiple empirical claims, which are
difficult to prove, however, we think that without any em-
pirical proof, there is, prima facie, no strong reasons to
accept the SSA as imperative objection to GGE. Further,
attitudes and regulations regarding PGD within Europe
are similar but not equal and European regulations for
PGD tend to be more developed or stricter compared to
the US and China. Even though we acknowledge the diffi-
culties of guaranteeing an appropriate legal framework we
argue that there is no reason to believe that a loss of con-
trol with GGE could not be prevented through appropri-
ate laws and regulations – as the practice of PGD and the
Dutch example of Euthanasia shows. We agree with Wal-
ton that “the burden of proof “regarding the likelihood of
GGE for medical purposes(A) leading to the “morally
catastrophic” use of GGE for eugenics (B) is on “the side
of those who use the slippery slope argument against con-
tinuing with germline therapy” [53].
The autonomy of the parents and the right to know and
not to know
Respecting patient autonomy and the “right to know”,
i.e. a patient’s right to be informed about the risks and
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benefits of a specific treatment, has recently gained im-
portance in medical ethics and medical practice as a fun-
damental ethical and legal principle [62, 63]. Recent
developments in the patient-doctor relationship show a
shift from a “paternalistic” model in which the doctor is
allowed to withhold information towards more auton-
omy for the patient based on full knowledge. In this con-
text, the “right to know” is considered of paramount
importance as necessary condition for patients to make
autonomous decisions. In recent years, whole genome
sequencing has become available for PGD so that mul-
tiple genetic disorders can now be tested for simultan-
eously. Given the increasing number of choices to weigh
against each other in order to find the ‘best’ option, it is
important to discuss implications on decision making in
modern reproductive medicine. Advocates of PGD and
GGE argue that to empower future parents to take an
autonomous decision, sufficient information (i.e. know-
ledge regarding the genetic make-up of the embryo)
should be available to those that want to base their con-
sidered judgement on this kind of information.
Sandell, on the other hand, has raised concerns that
this potentially represents a detrimental tendency to-
wards a ‘hyperagency’ to master every aspect of life in
general and child rearing in particular [64]. A study
evaluating attitudes towards PNT has highlighted con-
cerns about increasing social pressure upon parents. Not
testing could be perceived as giving away control over
the health of a future child, therefore not being a re-
sponsible parent [65]. Opponents to PGD and GGE have
argued that this kind of overemphasize on autonomy
might lead to a loss of the right not to decide. In the case
of PGD and GGE, this implies that the future parent
would then become morally obliged, rather than entitled,
to act autonomously [66]. In light of this, it has been ar-
gued that the burden of knowledge (for patients or fu-
ture parents) can potentially be unbearable and thus it
was called for a right not to know. The rationale behind
this claim is that genetic testing might provide the pa-
tient with information regarding increased risks from
serious diseases without having any means to reduce
these risks or to get treatment [63]. Advocates of the
“right not to know” claim that knowledge of these risks
are potentially too great of a burden and cause unbear-
able psychological stress. Along these lines, it is argued
that the knowledge regarding genetic traits of an embryo
can also come with the burden of knowledge and choice.
It is argued that the right not to know follows from the
“do no harm” principle and that autonomy leaves open
the possibility to choose not to know and as such, is fun-
damentally different to a paternalistic doctor-patient
model.
Together, this shows that decision making in repro-
ductive medicine is very challenging, taking into account
the emotions and uncertainty that are natural to the
process of creating a family. It would be disastrous if the
concept of autonomy (be it the right to know or not to
know) were to be transformed into a duty to control
one’s life or the future child’s life, and thus, it is of para-
mount importance that autonomy of future parents is
secured.
PGD and GGE both represent challenging decisions
regarding an equilibrium between accepting and pushing
aspects of parenting. Parenting comes with the responsi-
bility of acting in the best interest of the child without
its consent. Importantly, the interpretation of what du-
ties and responsibilities parents have is left to the au-
tonomous parents (as long as their practice is within the
limits of the law). Similarly, we believe, that PGD or
GGE represent choices for the autonomous parents and
as such, are not fundamentally different to widely ac-
cepted child rearing measures, as long as they are done
in the best interest for the health of the future child. In
light of this, arguments based on parental autonomy
should not be used against the application of gene tech-
nologies in ART in order to prevent the manifestation of
a severe hereditary disease but should be used to stress
the importance of appropriate regulations and laws to
secure the autonomy of future parents and future
children.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed four arguments against
the use of human GGE in the context of severe heredi-
tary diseases. The first argument concerned the dignity
of the human genome on the level of the individual and
the level of the human species. We have argued that
GGE to prevent a severe disease is not fundamentally
different from other actions parents take without the
consent of their child, e.g. as long as GGE is applied in
the best interest of the future child for a healthy life and
not in the interest of the parents for themselves, i.e. if
the future child is an end in itself, then the intrinsic
value of the future child is respected and its dignity is
not violated.
In our opinion, arguments linking human dignity to
the integrity of “the” human genome are weak because
the human gene pool underlies constant changes and
presents a great variety between its individual. It’s also
unclear why and how the normative claim not to modify
the human genome could be deduced from a reference
to the “nature” of the genome. Moreover, in today’s
medicine there is no line between “natural” and “unnat-
ural” therapy. Also, references to the sacredness of na-
ture based on the authority of god is not a valid reason
to prohibit action in a secular world. We have also ar-
gued that in comparison to the widely accepted practice
of PGD which leads to discarding surplus embryos, GGE
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cannot be considered a fundamentally different form of
instrumentalization (assuming that either of these prac-
tices represent an instrumentalization in the first place
which is a notion we do not agree with).
The second argument was related to physical integrity
and the right to physical autonomy and self-determination.
The ‘non-identity problem’ described by Parfit [37]
deals with the question of how current actions can affect
future generations. Since one cannot argue that it’s
harming someone when an alternative does not exist, we
do not think that one can argue that PGD can harm the
future child. GGE on the other hand can potentially
harm the future child. However, we have argued that as
long as GGE is considered reasonably safe and as long as
GGE is applied in the best interest of the child, then
GGE is not a fundamental infringement of the physical
integrity or autonomy of the future child – or at least
not a fundamentally different infringement compared to
other parental medical decisions for their unborn child,
e.g. nutrition, lifestyle of pregnant mother, etc.
J. Feinberg called for ‘anticipatory autonomy rights’ of the
unborn child, such as the right to live an autonomous life
and to make one’s own decisions. We argued that Mills’
idea of ‘directive and biased parenting’ is not mutually ex-
clusive with Feinberg’s claim for a ‘maximally open future’
for the future child. In fact, we have argued that GGE is not
fundamentally different to PGD or other parental decisions
taken without the consent of the child in the best interest
of the future child. GGE to prevent severe hereditary dis-
eases would in fact, by bettering the health of a future child
likely open more doors that would be closed otherwise. In
fact, GGE is autonomy-enhancing not reducing.
Next, we turned to the argument that “selective abortion
after prenatal diagnosis is morally problematic as it ex-
presses negative or discriminatory attitudes, not merely
about a disabling trait, but about those who carry it” [44].
We agreed with Savulescu who challenges the expressivist
argument by highlighting the difference between disability
and persons living with a disability [49]. According to
Savulescu, selection implies a normative statement regard-
ing a disease but is silent on the value of persons living
with said disease [50]. We used the example of an obese
child and the parents’ wish and efforts to make their child
lose weight in the health interest of their child. In our
opinion, the counterintuitive and clearly wrong implica-
tion of the expressivist argument would be that the par-
ents wish and efforts in our example represent a
discrimination of obese people. The expressivist argument
is thus defeasible for both PGD and GGE.
The fourth argument concerned the slippery slope argu-
ments that GGE for preventing severe hereditary diseases
would lead to human enhancement and eugenics. We ac-
knowledge, that GGE and PGD should both be considered
as “morally problematic” (in an Agarian sense, because
they potentially allow for morally good or morally bad in-
terventions. However, we do not think that GGE and
PGD should be considered morally wrong interventions.
GGE for medical purposes is fundamentally different to
GGE for non-medical applications. There are, prima facie,
no reasons to believe that the moral acceptance for both is
similar. Also, specific ‘drivers’ have yet to be identified that
make a ‘loss of control’ and sliding down the slope to-
wards eugenics inevitable. Importantly, as our example of
euthanasia in the Netherlands has shown, laws and regula-
tions provide a strong means not only to prevent sliding
down the slope, but in fact, potentially provide a means to
move up into the other direction. However, we do agree
that ‘selective mentality’, hyperagency and overemphasize
on autonomy in modern medicine potentially represent
challenges for legalizing GGE. However, this does not pro-
vide imperative objections to PGD or GGE, but rather
shows that a public and political discussion is necessary
on how society defines responsible parenthood in the con-
text of reproductive medicine and genetic tests. To pre-
vent misuse of GGE, the practice should be put on hold
until appropriate laws and regulations are put into effect.
It is important that these laws promote the autonomy of
the parents (be it the right to know or the right not to
know) and the future child.
To summarize, we do not think that any of the dis-
cussed objections provide imperative grounds to object
PGD or GGE. PGD and GGE both aim at helping par-
ents have a healthy, genetically related child. However,
the two methods differ from each other in concept and
scale. With PGD parents can only select from a limited
number of embryos they themselves have conceived.
GGE, on the other hand, bears the potential to modify
genomes to have specific wanted traits. Following the ar-
guments provided in this paper, the claim that the gen-
etic modification of an embryo in order to prevent the
manifestation of a severe hereditary disease is at least as
morally acceptable as PGD, as postulated by the ESHRE/
ESHG, can be considered valid under the following con-
ditions: Only gene variants that already exist within the
human gene pool are used and GGE is restricted to pro-
moting the child’s interest in good health in cases of se-
vere hereditary diseases.
However, this paper is not a plea to rush towards clin-
ical use of GGE. Our conclusion is limited to the argu-
ments discussed above. As pointed out in the
introduction, other important moral concerns (e.g. social
justice, distribution of scarce resources, intergenerational
relationships [67]) will need to be taken into consider-
ation, too. It is important to mention again that we
set all safety and technical issues aside for the sake of
the argument. Naturally, prior to any clinical implemen-
tation of GGE, addressing these concerns including a
harm-benefit-analysis is inevitable.
v. Hammerstein et al. BMC Medical Ethics           (2019) 20:83 Page 11 of 13
Abbreviations
BBAW: Berlin Brandenburg Akademie der Wissenschaften; CRIN: The Child
International Network; Crispr Cas: Clustered regularly interspaced short
palindromic repeats - Crispr associated systems; ESHRE/ESHG: European
Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology; GGE: Germline gene
editing; IVF: In-vitro-fertilization; NAS/ NAM: National Academy of Science
and National Academy of Medicine; NEC: National Ethics Committee of
Switzerland; PGD: Preimplantation genetic diagnosis; PNT: Prenatal testing;
SSA: Slippery slope argument; UDHGHR: UNESCO Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights; UDHR: Universal Declaration on Human Rights
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Dr. Anna Deplazes for the interesting discussions and Dr.
Adrian v. Hammerstein for proofreading the manuscript.
Authors’ contributions
AH, ME and NBA made equal contributions to the design of the study. AH
and ME drafted the manuscript. AH, ME and NBA contributed substantially to
revisions of the manuscript. All authors have read and approved the submitted
manuscript.
Funding
The work of Dr. Matthias Eggel is funded by the Messerli Foundation,
Switzerland. The funding body was not involved in any way in this work (e.g.
the design of the study, collection, analysis, and interpretation of data nor in
writing the manuscript).
Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 17 June 2019 Accepted: 16 September 2019
References
1. Mali P, et al. RNA-guided human genome engineering via Cas9. Science.
2013;339(6121):823–6.
2. Jinek M, et al. RNA-programmed genome editing in human cells. Elife. 2013;
2:e00471.
3. Cong L, et al. Multiplex genome engineering using CRISPR/Cas systems.
Science. 2013;339(6121):819–23.
4. Europe, C.o., Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, in 164, C.o.
Europe, Editor. 1997.
5. Araki M, Ishii T. International regulatory landscape and integration of
corrective genome editing into in vitro fertilization. Reprod Biol Endocrinol.
2014;12:108.
6. Isasi R, Kleiderman E, Knoppers BM. Editing policy to fit the genome?
Framing genome editing policy requires setting thresholds of acceptability.
Science. 2016;351(6271):337–9.
7. Liang P, et al. CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing in human tripronuclear
zygotes. Protein Cell. 2015;6(5):363–72.
8. Cyranoski D, Ledford H. Genome-edited baby claim provokes international
outcry. Nature. 2018;563(7733):607–8.
9. Lanphier E, et al. Don‘t edit the human germ line. Nature. 2015;519(7544):
410–1.
10. Cavaliere G. Genome editing and assisted reproduction: curing embryos,
society or prospective parents? Med Health Care Phil. 2018;21(2):215–25.
11. Handyside AH, et al. Pregnancies from biopsied human preimplantation
embryos sexed by Y-specific DNA amplification. Nature. 1990;344(6268):
768–70.
12. Sermon K, Van Steirteghem A, Liebaers I. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis.
Lancet. 2004;363(9421):1633–41.
13. Präg P., M.M.C., Assisted Reproductive Technology in Europe: Usage and
Regulation in the Context of Cross-Border Reproductive Care, in
Childlessness in Europe: Contexts, Causes, and Consequences. 2017,
Springer Link p pp 289-309.
14. Gallagher, J. US ʻwill not fund research for modifying embryo DNAʼ. 2015;
Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/health-32530334. Accessed 25
Mar 2018.
15. De Wert G, et al. Responsible innovation in human germline gene editing:
background document to the recommendations of ESHG and ESHRE. Eur J
Hum Genet. 2018.
16. Gyngell C, Douglas T, Savulescu J. The ethics of Germline gene editing. J
Appl Philos. 2017;34(4):498–513.
17. National Academies of Sciences, E., and Medicine, Human Genome Editing:
Science, Ethics and Governance. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press, 2017.
18. Bioethics, N.C.o., Genome Editing and Human Reproduction: social and
ethical issues. London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2018.
19. Humanmedizin, N.E.K.B., Gene editing an menschlichen Embryonen - Eine
Auslegeordnung, N.E.K.B. Humanmedizin, Editor. 2016.
20. Reich J., F.H., Fehse B., Hampel J., Hucho F., Köchy K., Korte M., Müller-Röber
B., Taupitz J., Genomchirurgie beim Menschen - Zur verantwortlichen
Bewertung einer neuen Technologie, B.-B.A.d. Wissenschaften, Editor. 2015:
Berlin.
21. Cahill, L.S., Germline genetics, human nature, and social ethics. Design and
Destiny: Jewish and Christian Perspectives on Human Germline
Modification, 2008: p. 145–166.
22. Mulvihill JJ, et al. Ethical issues of CRISPR technology and gene editing
through the lens of solidarity. Br Med Bull. 2017;122(1):17–29.
23. Assembly, P., Recommendation on Genetic Engeneering, in Recommendation
935, C.o. Europe, Editor. 1982.
24. UNESCO, Universal declaration on the human genome and human rights,
UNESCO, Editor. 1997.
25. Andorno R. Human dignity and human rights as a common ground for a
global bioethics. J Med Philos. 2009;34(3):223–40.
26. Camenzind, S., Instrumentalisierung. Zur Transformation einer
Grundkategorie der Moral in der Ethik der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung., in
Veterinärmedizinische Universität Wien. 2019, Universität Wien: Wien.
27. Kant, I., J.W. Ellington, and I. Kant, Grounding for the metaphysics of morals;
with, On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns. 3rd ed.
1993, Indianapolis: Hackett pub. Co. xiv, 78 p.
28. Annas GJ, Andrews LB, Isasi RM. Protecting the endangered human: toward
an international treaty prohibiting cloning and inheritable alterations. Am J
Law Med. 2002;28(2–3):151–78.
29. Venter JC, et al. The sequence of the human genome. Science. 2001;
291(5507):1304–51.
30. Fu W, Akey JM. Selection and adaptation in the human genome. Annu Rev
Genomics Hum Genet. 2013;14:467–89.
31. Genomes Project C, et al. A global reference for human genetic variation.
Nature. 2015;526(7571):68–74.
32. Li WH, Sadler LA. Low nucleotide diversity in man. Genetics. 1991;129(2):
513–23.
33. Hume, D., A treatise of human nature. Retrieved ed. 1739, London: John
Noon.
34. Network, C.R.I. Bodily integrity. [cited 2019; Available from: https://home.crin.
org/issues/bodily-integrity.
35. Herring J, Jesse W. The Nature And The Significance Of The Right To Bodily
Integrity. Cambridge Law J. 2017;76(3):566–88.
36. Meaney MJ. Maternal care, gene expression, and the transmission of
individual differences in stress reactivity across generations. Annu Rev
Neurosci. 2001;24:1161–92.
37. Parfit, D. Reasons and Persons. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1984.
38. Watene K. Nussbaum's capability approach and future generations. J
Human Dev Capabilities. 2013;14(1):21–39.
39. Feinberg, J., The Child's Right to an Open Future, in Whose Child? Children's
Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power. 1980: Totowa NJ: Rowman &
Littlefield.
40. Mills C. The Child's right to an open future? J Soc Phil. 2003;34(4):499.
41. Albert, B., Briefing note: the social model of disability, human rights and
development, D.K.R. Project, Editor. 2004.
42. Millum J. The foundation of the child's right to an open future. J Soc Philos.
2014;45(4):522–38.
v. Hammerstein et al. BMC Medical Ethics           (2019) 20:83 Page 12 of 13
43. Thomas C. Female forms: experiencing and understanding disability.
Buckingham: Open Univ. Press; 1999.
44. Gonter C. The Expressivist Argument, Prenatal Diagnosis, and Selective
Abortion: An Appeal to the Social Construction of Disability. Macalester J
Philosophy. 2004;13(1):3.
45. Asch A, Barlevy D, Disability and Genetics: A Disability Critique of Pre-natal
Testing and Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis. eLS. Wiley: Chichester, 2012.
46. Scully JL. Disability and genetics in the era of genomic medicine. Nat Rev
Genet. 2008;9(10):797–802.
47. Asch, A., Disability and Genetics: A Disability Rights Perspective. eLS. Wiley:
Chichester, 2006.
48. Parens E, Asch A. Disability rights critique of prenatal genetic testing: reflections
and recommendations. Ment Retard Dev Disabil Res Rev. 2003;9(1):40–7.
49. Savulescu J. Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best
children. Bioethics. 2001;15(5–6):413–26.
50. van der Burg W. The slippery slope argument. Ethics. 1991;102(1):42–65.
51. Rizzo MJ, Whitman DG. The camel’s nose in the tent: Rules, theories and
slippery slopes. UCLA Law Rev. 2003;51:539–92.
52. Agar N. Why we should defend gene editing as eugenics. Camb Q Healthc
Ethics. 2019;28(1):9–19.
53. Walton D. The slippery slope argument in the ethical debate on genetic
engineering of humans. Sci Eng Ethics. 2017;23(6):1507–28.
54. Medicine, T.N.A.o.S.a.t.N.A.o. With Stringent Oversight, Heritable Germline
Editing Clinical Trials Could One Day Be Permitted for Serious Conditions;
Non-Heritable Clinical Trials Should Be Limited to Treating or Preventing
Disease or Disability at This Time 2017 [cited 2017; Available from: http://
www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=24623.
Accessed 20 Mar 2018.
55. McGleenan T. Human gene therapy and slippery slope arguments. J Med
Ethics. 1995;21(6):350–5.
56. Anniek Corveleyn, E.Z., Michael Morris, Elisabeth Dequeker, James Lawford
Davies, Karen Sermon, Guillermo Antiñolo, Andreas Schmutzler, Jiri Vanecek,
Fransesc Palau, Dolores Ibarreta, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis in
Europe, E. Commission, Editor. Type: EUR - Scientific and Technical Research
Reports. OPOCE; 2007. ISBN: 978-92-79-05654-3. ISSN: 1018-5593. http://
www.jrc.es/publications/pub.cfm?id=1531.
57. Bundesrat, S., Botschaft zur Änderung der Verfassungsbestimmung zur
Fortpflanzungsmedizin und Gentechnologie im Humanbereich (Art. 119 BV)
sowie des Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzes (PrÄimplantationsdiagnostik), in
13.051, Bundesrat, Editor. 2013.
58. Pennings G. Belgian law on medically assisted reproduction and the
disposition of supernumerary embryos and gametes. Eur J Health Law.
2007;14(3):251–60.
59. Authority, H.F.a.E. PGD conditions. 2018; Available from: https://www.hfea.
gov.uk/pgd-conditions/. Accessed 19 Mar 2018.
60. Bayefsky MJ. Comparative preimplantation genetic diagnosis policy in
Europe and the USA and its implications for reproductive tourism. Reprod
Biomed Soc Online. 2016;3:41–7.
61. Cyranoski D. China’s embrace of embryo selection raises thorny questions.
Nature. 2017;548(7667):272–4.
62. Gillon R. Ethics needs principles—four can encompass the rest—and
respect for autonomy should be “first among equals”. J Med Ethics. 2003;
29(5):307–12.
63. Andorno R. The right not to know: an autonomy based approach. J Med
Ethics. 2004;30(5):435–9.
64. Sandel, M.J., The case against perfection: what’s wrong with designer
children, bionic athletes, and genetic engineering. Atl Mon, 2004. 292(3): p.
50-4, 56-60, 62.
65. Lewis C, Silcock C, Chitty LS. Non-invasive prenatal testing for Down’s
syndrome: pregnant women’s views and likely uptake. Public Health
Genomics. 2013;16(5):223–32.
66. Roter D. The practice of autonomy: patients, doctors, and medical decisions
(review). J Health Polit Policy Law. 2000;25(4):770–4.
67. Rehmann-Sutter C. Why human Germline editing is more problematic than
selecting between embryos: ethically considering intergenerational
relationships. New Bioethics. 2018;24(1):9–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/
20502877.2018.1441669.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
v. Hammerstein et al. BMC Medical Ethics           (2019) 20:83 Page 13 of 13
